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ARTICLE
THE RICHNESS OF EXPERIENCE, EMPATHY, AND THE
ROLE OF A JUDGE: THE SENATE CONFIRMATION
HEARINGS FORJUDGE SONIA SOTOMAYOR
By: The Honorable Arrie W. Davis*

S

ince the Senate confirmation hearings of Judge Robert Bark, Supreme
Court nominees have rarely been forthcoming in answering questions
about their personal views on controversial topics, including how
expansive a judge's role is in deciding cases. 1 In recent years, the now
* Senior Judge, Maryland Court of Special Appeals, author of approximately I ,900
opinions, of which 275 are published opinions of the Court since 1990; trial judge on the
District Court for Baltimore City and Circuit Court for Baltimore City from March, 1981 to
December, 1990; Faculty Member, Maryland Judicial Institute. Many of the themes
developed in this article have been lifted from a course that I teach annually to Maryland
judges appointed within the preceding year. My thanks go out to my former Jaw clerk, Ranya
Ghuma, for her invaluable assistance in the preparation of this article. I also wish to
acknowledge two colleagues and special friends, Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, Robert
M. Bell and former Chief Judge of the Court of Special Appeals, Joseph F. Murphy, who, by
their careers, have provided inspiration for many of the perspectives provided herein and who
will celebrate with me our fortieth anniversary as members of the Maryland Bar on December
19,2009.
1
Robert Bork, a United States Court of Appeals judge for the District of Columbia
Circuit, was nominated by President Ronald Reagan for Supreme Court Justice Lewis
Powell's seat on July I, 1987. Manuel Miranda, The Original Barking: Lessons from a
Court
Nominee's
Defeat,
WALL
ST.
J.,
Aug.
24,
2005,
Supreme
http://www.opinionjournal.com/nextjustice/?id=ll0007149. Within forty-five minutes of
Bork's nomination to the Court, Senator Ted Kennedy lambasted Bork on the floor of the
Senate in a nationally televised speech, declaring:
Robert Bork's America is a land in which women would be forced into back-alley
abortions, blacks would sit at segregated lunch counters, rogue police could break
down citizens' doors in midnight raids, schoolchildren could not be taught about
evolution, writers and artists could be censored at the whim of the Government, and
the doors of the Federal courts would be shut on the fingers of millions of citizens
for whom the judiciary is-and is often the only-protector of the individual rights
that are the heart of our democracy.
!d.; Kevin McMahon, Presidents, Political Regimes, and Contentious Supreme Court
Nominations: A Historical institutional Model, 32 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 919, 936-37 (2007).
The Reagan White House, stunned by the rapid response to Kennedy's "Robert Bork's
America" speech, did not respond for two and a half months. Miranda, supra. The Senate
confirmation hearings began on September 15, 1987 and Bork's nomination was ultimately
defeated after a hotly contested debate in the United States Senate. ld.; see also James Reston,
WASHiNGTON; Kennedy and Bork, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 5, 1987, § 4, at 15 (discussing
contentious nature of the Judge Bork's nomination proceedings).
The first use of the term "Borked" as a verb was possibly by the Atlanta JournalConstitution on August 20, 1987, when it "referred to the way Democrats savaged Ronald
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familiar "kabuki dance" 2 of Supreme Court nominees could be best
characterized by scholars who spoke of Thomas Jefferson as never being
in a state of "verbal undress." 3 Supreme Court nominees appearing for
confirmation before the Senate Judiciary Committee are understandably
circumspect in responding to questions designed to uncover their
political and ideological perspectives because, to do so, exposes them to
the charge that their decision-making will be based on such perspectives.
That such a concern is warranted is borne out by the statement of Senator
Lindsey Graham of South Carolina in addressing Judge Sotomayor
during the confirmation hearing:
The reason these speeches [made to groups of law students]
matter and the reasons elections matter is because people now
understand the role of the court in modem society when it comes
to social change. That's why we fight so hard to put on the court
people who see the world like us. That's true from the left, and
that's true from the right. 4
Senator Graham's statement is emblematic of the respective positions of
warring political and cultural factions whose goal is nothing less than a
Supreme Court constituted by nine justices, all reflective of the point of
view of the respective factions.
President Barack Obama's public announcement that his ideal
nominee for the Supreme Court should possess empathy5 provided the
opportunity for those who opposed the appointment of Judge Sonia
Reagan's nominee, the Appeals Court judge Robert H. Bork, the year before." William Satire,
The Way We Live Now: 5-27-01: On Language; Judge Fights, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2001,
http://www.nytimes.com/200 1/05/2 7/magazine/the-way-we-live-now-5-2 7-0 I-on-languagejudge-fights.html?scp= I &sq=william%20safire%20may%2027, %20200 1&st=cse.
2
A "Kabuki" dance is a "traditional Japanese popular drama performed with highly
stylized singing and dancing." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 680 (11th ed.
2004). It has been used at times to refer to what is perceived to be a highly-scripted and
politicized confirmation process. See, e.g., David R. Stras, Understanding the New Politics of
Judicial Appointments, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1033, 1066 (2008) (reviewing BENJAMIN WITTES,
CONFIRMATION WARS: PRESERVING INDEPENDENT COURTS IN ANGRY TIMES (2006) and JAN
CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR
CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (2007)).
3
In an August II, 2006, interview conducted by David Brancaccio of PBS, when asked
about the language of politicians, actress and playright, Anna Deveare Smith responded: "It
was a Jefferson scholar who told me that Jefferson could never be found in verbal undress."
NOW: Show 232 (PBS television broadcast Aug. 11, 2006) (transcript available at
http://www.pbs.org/now/transcript/232.html).
4

Sen. Graham Questions Judge Sotomayor at Supreme Court Nomination Hearings,

WASH. PosT, July 16, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/contentlarticle/2009/
07/16/AR200907!60 1659 .htrnl.
5
Jerry Markon, Obama's Empathy Standard Drawing Heat, WASH. POST, May 21,
2009, http://voices. washingtonpost.com/supreme-court/2009/05/obamas_empathy_standard_
drawin.html.
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Sotomayor to the Supreme Court to question whether Judge Sotomayor
could be dispassionate in her decision-making. The process surrounding
Judge Sotomayor's confirmation reflects the perennial debate as to
whether, and to what extent, a judge's personal experiences should
influence his or her adjudication of disputes. The questions posed by the
members of the Senate Judiciary Committee and Judge Sotomayor's
responses provide the framework for the instant analysis of the proper
role of a judge. Rather than an examination of Judge Sotomayor's
judicial philosophy, as reflected in her seventeen-year career as a judge
on the United States District Court for the Southern District ofNew York
and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, 6 the focus of this article is on
where we are in the public conversation regarding the role of a judge.
As background, Part I consists of an explication of various theories of
judicial philosophy, i.e., whether a judge's role is restricted solely to
applying the letter of the law or whether, under certain circumstances,
judges may rely on policy factors to ensure that the application of the law
reflects and serves important societal interests. In Part II, the article
considers the extent to which a judge's personal experiences, ideology,
identity, and world view should influence his or her decision-making.
The role of empathy and collegiality in judicial decision-making is also
addressed. Part III anchors the discussion with a reminder of the
importance of precedent and the rule of law. Finally, the conclusion
makes the case for why it is important that there be justices or judges with
divergent views on the Supreme Court (or any appellate court) facilitating
a crucible of robust debate, out ofwhich emerge decisions properly tested
by perspectives representative of the broad societal spectrum.
I. FORMALISM, REALISM, AND WHAT LIES IN BETWEEN: THE REALITIES OF
JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING

During her confirmation hearing, Judge Sotomayor was roundly
criticized by various members of the Senate Judiciary Committee for
what they perceived to be indicia of Judge Sotomayor's bias and inability
to be impartial and the prospect that her decisions would be rooted in
"identity politics." 7 Particular emphasis was placed on comments made

6
For general biographical information about Judge Sotomayor, see Alan Wirzbicki,
Sonia Sotomayor, BOSTON GLOBE, May 27, 2009, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/
washington/articles/2009/05/2 7/sonia_ sotomayor/.
7
See, e.g., Sarah Lovenheim, Key Excerpt: Graham and Sotomayor on Identity Politics
and "Wise Latina" Comment, WASH. POST, July 16, 2009, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/
supreme-court/2009/07 /key _excerpt_graham_and_sotomay_3 .html. The Stanford
Encyclopedia orPhilosophy describes the term "identity politics" as follows:
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by the judge in a 2001 lecture for a symposium entitled Raising the Bar:
Latino and Latina Presence in the Judiciary and the Struggle for
Representation, during which she stated that she "would hope that a wise
Latina woman with the richness of her experiences would more often
than not reach a better conclusion than a white male who hasn't lived that
life."8 Senator Jon Kyl, a Republican from Arizona, further asked the
[A] wide range of political activity and theorizing founded in the shared experiences
of injustice of members of certain social groups. Rather than organizing solely
around belief systems, programmatic manifestoes, or party affiliation, identity
political formations typically aim to secure the political freedom of a specific
constituency marginalized within its larger context.
CRESSIDA REYES, IDENTITY POLITICS, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta ed.)
(2009), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/identity-politics/ (last visited Nov.
24, 2009).
8
Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, Judge Mario G. Olmos Memorial Lecture: L~tina Judge's
Voice, 13 LA RAZA L.J. 87, 92 (2002). It is helpful, for purposes of context, to reproduce here
the statements made by Sonia Sotomayor that preceded and followed the now infamous "wise
Latina" comment:
Whether born from experience or inherent physiological or cultural differences, a
possibility I abhor less or discount less than my colleague Judge Cedarbaum, our
gender and national origins may and will make a difference in our judging. Justice
O'Connor has often been cited as saying that a wise old man and wise old woman
will reach the same conclusion in deciding cases. I am not so sure Justice O'Connor
is the author of that line since Professor Resnik attributes that line to Supreme Court
Justice Coyle. I am also not so sure that I agree with the statement. First, as
Professor Martha Minnow has noted, there can never be a universal definition of
wise. Second, I would hope that a wise Latina woman with the richness of her
experiences would more often than not reach a better conclusion than a white male
who hasn't lived that life.
Let us not forget that wise men like Oliver Wendell Holmes and Justice Cardozo
voted on cases which upheld both sex and race discrimination in our society. Until
1972, no Supreme Court case ever upheld the claim of a woman in a gender
discrimination case. I, like Professor Carter, believe that we should not be so
myopic as to believe that others of different experiences or backgrounds are
incapable of understanding the values and needs of people from a different group.
Many are so capable. As Judge Cedarbaum pointed out to me, nine white men on
the Supreme Court in the past have done so on many occasions and on many issues .,
including Brown.

....

However, to understand takes time and effort, something that not all people are
willing to give. For others, their experiences limit their ability to understand the
experiences of others. Others simply do not care. Hence, one must accept the
proposition that a difference there will be by the presence of women and people of
color on the bench. Personal experiences affect the facts that judges choose to see.
My hope is that I will take the good from my experiences and extrapolate them
further into areas with which I am unfamiliar. I simply do not know exactly what
that difference will be in my judging. But I accept there will be some based on my
gender and my Latina heritage.

!d.
See also Profile: Sonia Sotomayor,
http://news. bbc.co. uk/2/hi/americas/806863 7 .strn.

BBC

NEWS,

Aug.

7,

2009,
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nominee to account for additional comments made in that same lecture, in
which she remarked:
[B]ecause I accept the proposition that, as Judge Resnik describes
it, "to judge is an exercise of power" and because as, another
former law school classmate, Professor Martha Minnow of
Harvard Law School, states "there is no objective stance but only
a series of perspectives-no neutrality, no escape from choice in
judging," I further accept that our experiences as women and
The aspiration to
people of color affect our decisions.
impartiality is just that--it's an aspiration because it denies the
fact that we are by our experiences making different choices than
others. 9
In his opening comments, Senator Kyl attacked President Barack
Obama's comments, made during the confirmation hearing for Chief
Justice John Roberts, where then-Senator Obama articulated that
adherence to legal precedent would dispose of ninety-five percent of the
cases but that, in those five percent of truly difficult cases before the
Supreme Court, where constitutional text does not directly govern, what
matters in a nominee is "what is in the judge's heart." 10 In Senator Kyl's
opinion, the foregoing comments by Judge Sotomayor suggested that she
adhered to this "new model of judging," rather than one emphasizing
impartiality and the application of the law, placing her and President
Obama, in Senator Kyl's view, "outside the mainstream." 11 Senator Kyl
was not alone in pursuing this line of questioning. 12 Conservative
senators on the Judiciary Committee premised their questions on the
assumption that, notwithstanding Judge Sotomayor's professed "fidelity
to the law," her prior speeches and public statements reflected the view
that it was a proper function of federal circuit court judges to "make"
law. 13 The views expressed by many of the senators manifested their
9

Sotomayor, supra note 8, at 91.
Transcript: Sen. Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.) Opening Statement, WASH. POST, July 13, 2009,
~ttp://www. washingtonpost.corn/wp-srv/politics/documents/kyl_openingstatement_ sotomayor
..• tml.
11
Transcript: Sen. Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.) Opening Statement, supra note 10.
12
Sen. Lindsey Graham Holds a Hearing on the Nomination of Judge Sonia Sotomayor
to Be an Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, WASH. POST, July 14, 2009,
http://www. washingtonpost.corn/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07 /14/AR2009071402782.html.
13
Another public statement for which Judge Sotomayor was roundly criticized was her
comment, during remarks made in 2005 at Duke University Law School, that federal circuit
courts make policy. See Jake Tapper, White House Officials Dismiss Criticisms of Sotomayor,
Say She was Likely Pick from Beginning, ABC NEWS, May 26, 2009,
http:/lblogs.abcnews.corn/politicalpunch/2009/05/white-house-off.html. After the "policy"
comment, Judge Sotomayor subsequently remarked, "I know, and I know, that this is on tape,
and I should never say that. Because we don't 'make law,' I know," and added, after the
audience laughed: "I'm not promoting it, and I'm not advocating it .... Having said that, the
10
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concerns regarding whether Judge Sotomayor's view of her role as a
judge was more expansive than appropriate and whether, as a member of
the Court, she would propagate an ideology culturally unacceptable to
them. 14
Judge Sotomayor, for her part, emphatically rejected any attempt to
paint her as a judge motivated by bias rather than guided by impartiality.
During her opening comments, Judge Sotomayor characterized her
judicial philosophy as simply "fidelity to the law .... The task of a judge
is not to make law. It is to apply the law." 15 In response to questioning
by Senator Kyl, Judge Sotomayor disagreed with comments made by
then-Senator Obama regarding "what is in the judge's heart" as the
"critical ingredient" in determining hard cases. 16 According to Judge
Sotomayor, "[i]t's not the heart that compels conclusions in cases, it's the
law." 17 As for the "wise Latina" comment, Judge Sotomayor argued that
"[t]he context of the words that I spoke have created a
misunderstanding," adding:
To give everyone assurances, I want to state upfront,
unequivocally and without doubt, I do not believe that any ethnic,
racial or gender group has an advantage in sound judging. I do
believe that every person has equal opportunity to become a good
and wise judge, regardless of their background or life
experiences. 18
When asked whom she considered worthy of emulation, Judge
Sotomayor cited Benjamin Cardozo, who served on the Supreme Court

Court of Appeals is where, before the Supreme Court makes the final decision, the law is
percolating. It's interpretation, it's application." /d.
14
See, e.g., Sen. Grassley Questions Judge Sotomayor at Supreme Court Nomination
Hearings, WASH. POST, July 16, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2009/07 /16/AR2009071602214.html (questioning Judge Sotomayor about her
commitment to applying precedent and whether she believes the Supreme Court should fill
vacuums in the law left by Congress); Sen. Graham Questions Judge Sotomayor at Supreme
Court Nomination Hearings, supra note 4 ("The reason these speeches matter and the reasons
elections matter is because people now understand the role of the court in modem society
when it comes to social change. That's why we fight so hard to put on the court people who
see the world like us. That's true from the left, and that's true from the right."); Chairman's
Opening Statements, Cornyn Questions Sotomayor at Supreme Court Nomination Hearings,
WASH. POST, July 15, 2009, http://www. washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2009/07/15/AR200907150 1255.html.
15
Robert Barnes, Amy Goldstein & Paul Kane, Sotomayor Pledges "Fidelity to the
Law,"
WASH. POST, July
14, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2009/07 /13/AR200907130 1154.html.
16
Ari Shapiro, Sotomayor Differs with Obama on 'Empathy' Issue, NAT'L PUB. RADIO,
July 14, 2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld= 106569335.
17 /d.
18 /d.
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from 1932 to 1938, 19 for his "great respect for precedent ... and
deference to the Legislative Branch. " 20
Despite Judge Sotomayor's attempts to establish her bona fides as an
impartial judge committed to deciding cases fairly and promoting the rule
of law, Senator Jeff Sessions, the senior Republican on the Senate
Judiciary Committee, concluded that, "[i]n speech after speech, year after
year, Judge Sotomayor set forth a fully formed ... judicial philosophy
that conflicts with the great American tradition of blind justice and
fidelity to the law as written." 21 Senator Sessions joined five other
Republican senators in voting against Judge Sotomayor's confirmation. 22
Thirteen members of the Senate Judiciary Committee, including twelve
Democrats and Republican Senator Lindsey Graham, voted in favor of
confirmation. 23
Certainly, the picture of how a judge approaches his or her role is
more complicated than either the questions or the responses articulated at
Judge Sotomayor's confirmation hearings represent. Is it credible, as
Senator Sessions suggested at the confirmation hearings, that the ability
.. to empathize with victims of injustice or to identify with marginalized
· groups "conflicts" with "blind justice" and the rule of law? 24 Or, does
19

Columbia University, Justice Cardozo's alma mater, writes:

Considered one of the great legal thinkers in American history, Benjamin Cardozo
was especially known as a spokesman on sociological jurisprudence and the
relationship between law and social change. He exerted his wide influence from
two prominent positions: first as a judge, and later chief judge, of the New York
State Court of Appeals; then, from 1932 until his death, as an associate justice of the
U.S. Supreme Court. There he joined with Louis D. Brandeis and Harlan Fiske
Stone (1898 Law) to uphold early New Deal legislation. Cardozo expounded his
philosophy of law and the judicial process in three classics of jurisprudence: The
Nature of the Judicial Process (1921), The Growth of the Law (1924), and The
Paradoxes ofLegal Science (1928).
C250 Celebrates
Columbians Ahead of their Time:
Benjamin
Cardozo,
http://c250.columbia.edu/c250_celebrates/remarkable_ columbians/benjamin_ cardozo.html
(last visited Nov. 24, 2009). See also Howard J. Vogel, The "Ordered Liberty" of Substantive
Due Process and the Future of Constitutional Law as Rhetorical Art: Variations on a Theme
From Justice Cardozo in the United States Supreme Court, 70 ALB. L. REv. 1473, 1473-76
(2007) (and sources cited therein).
20
See Jeffrey Rosen, What's Wrong with Judges Legislating from the Bench?, TiME, July
16, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1910714,00.html.
As Rosen
points out, ironically, it was Justice Cardozo who wrote that judges, like legislators, must get
their experience from life and, in cases where the law is unclear, that a judge must sometimes
"'pronounce judgment ... according to the rules which he [or she] would establish if he [or
she] were to assume the part of a legislator."' !d.
21
Senate
Panel Approves
Sotomayor,
BBC NEWS,
July 28,
2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8173036.stm.
22
Deborah Charles, Obama Supreme Court Pick Sotomayor Clears Panel, REUTERS, July
28, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE56R49020090728.
23 !d.
24 !d.
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justice require that the judiciary include judges who can empathize with
those subject to their dispensation? More to the point, is it possible for a
judge, tasked with the role of applying the law in a wide range of
discretionary contexts, to act without regard to the perspectives and
experiences informing that judge's background? If not, what personal
qualities, training, and ideological perspective render one best suited to
the process of adjudication?
In his keynote address to a Boston University School of Law
symposium on the Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century, Judge
Richard Posner described three categorical conceptions of a judge's
approach to the judicial process. 25 These categories, which constituted, in
Posner's view, three "points of an equilateral triangle," were identified by
Posner as "formalism, politics, and pragmatism." 26 Others addressing the
subject of methodological approaches to legal reasoning have similarly
identified three "discrete forms of legal analysis," described at different
times as "deduction," "analogy," and "practical reasoning," 27 or
"formalism," "analogy," and "realism." 28 In other instances, judicial
decision-making has been organized in terms of the "legal" model, the
"political" model, the "strategic" model, and the "litigant-driven"
model. 29
Volumes have been written about the nuances contained within each
of these approaches and their relative strengths and weaknesses. 30 No
matter the characterization, two key strands emerge from the literature.
These involve the degree to which a judge regards the law as the sole
source from which the "truth" emerges versus the degree to which a judge
integrates his or her ideological, social, or political preferences into
decision-making. The contradistinction between reliance solely on literal
law and integration of the judge's personal perspective, in the preceding
statement, intimates that, for many commentators, these two approaches,
which, respectively, are often associated with a "formalist" or "realist"
approach to legal decision-making, are viewed as mutually exclusive.
25
Richard A. Posner, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century, 86 B.U. L. REV.
1049, 1051 (2006).
26
/d.
27
Wilson Huhn, The Stages of Legal Reasoning: Formalism, Analogy and Realism, 48
VILL. L. REv. 305, 308 (2003) (citing Vincent Wellman, Practical Reasoning and Judicial
Justification: Toward an Adequate Theory, 57 U. COLO. L. REv. 45 (1985)).
28
Huhn, supra note 27, at 308.
29
Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CAL. L.
REv. 1457, 1460-62 (2003).
30
See, e.g., Edward S. Adams & Daniel A. Farber, Beyond the Formalism Debate:
Expert Reasoning, Fuzzy Logic, and Complex Statutes, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1243 (1999);
Richard Warner, The Three Theories of Legal Reasoning, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1523, 1551-70
(1989); Vincent Wellman, Practical Reasoning and Judicial Justification: Toward an
Adequate Theory, 57 U. CoLO. L. REv. 45 (1985).
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This article embraces the thesis that a judge, in reality, often applies both
approaches. As support for that proposition, and to apply it to the
following examination of Judge Sotomayor's confirmation hearings, a
brief explanation of both formalism and realism is required.
Neither formalism nor realism is susceptible to uniform definition. 31
Formalism, for example, has been used to describe both the classical
roots of the doctrine along with its modem variants. 32 Rather than
provide a definitive synopsis of the literature and theory defining these
two doctrines, it suffices for purposes of this article to set forth broad
distinctions between what has become generally known as "formalism"
and the countervailing "realist" approach.
Classical formalism, at its core, is generally understood as the
"traditional" or "conventional" conceptualization of appropriate judicial
decision-making. 33 Sometimes described as a "Langdellian" approach to
legal reasoning, formalism treats the law as a set of scientific formulae or
principles that are derived from the study of case law. 34 These principles
31
See, e.g., Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy,
Property, and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 564-65 & n.32 (1996).
Judge Posner explains:

The terms "legal formalism" and "legal realism" have a long history in legal
thought. Over the years they have accreted so many meanings and valences that
each has become an all-purpose term both of approbation and of disapprobation,
surpassing in this respect even 'judicial self-restraint" and "judicial activism."
"Formalist" can mean narrow, conservative, hypocritical, resistant to change,
casuistic, descriptively inaccurate (that is, "unrealistic" in the ordinary-language
sense of the word), ivory-towered, fallacious, callow, authoritarian-but also
rigorous, modest, reasoned, faithful, self-denying, restrained. "Realist" can mean
cynical, reductionist, manipulative, hostile to law, political, left-wing,
epistemologically naive-but also progressive, humane, candid, mature, clear-eyed.
These usages reflect the polemical character of so much writing about law. Legal
realism is also used to refer to the work of particular academic lawyers, mainly on
the Yale and Columbia faculties during the 1920's and 1930's, and to specific (and
diverse) ideas held by those men. Legal formalism refers to the work of judges and
academic lawyers whom the legal realists attacked and who attacked the realists in
tum.
Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and
the Constitution, 37 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 179, 180-81 (1987).
32
See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Roots of Formalism: Forms of Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L.
REv. 607 (1999). Professor Pildes emphasizes that modem formalisms differ sharply in
structure and in underlying justifications, rendering it difficult to view them as forming part of
a coherent or unified vision of modem legal formalism. See id.
33
See Posner, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century, supra note 25, at 1051.
34
See Pildes, supra note 32, at 608-09. Pildes explains that modem American legal
formalism manifests in various modes and that classical formalism represented a "scientific
system of thought" that "meant more than legal decisionmaking as rule-applying and
deductive reasoning"-<:oncepts applicable to any system oflaw-but rather envisioned
a scientific system of rules and institutions that were complete in that the system
made right answers available in all cases; formal in that right answers could be
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create an internal analytical framework which, when applied to a set of
facts, leads the decision-maker, through logical deduction, to the correct
outcome in a case. 35 Defenders of formalism posit that it "proffer[s] the
possibility of an 'immanent moral rationality"' 36 based on careful study
of the law:
In the formalist conception, law has a content that is not imported
from without but elaborated from within. Law is not so much an
instrument in the service of foreign ideals as an end in itself
constituting, as it were, its own ideal. Rather than being an
exclusively positivist transformation of the non-legal into the
juridical, law can involve the recognition of that which already
has an inchoate juridical significance. The paradigmatic legal
function is not the manufacturing of legal norms but the
understanding of what is intimated by juridical arrangements and
relationships. Legal creativity here is essentially cognitive, and it
is most naturally expressed in adjudication conceived more as the
discovery than as the making oflaw. 37
In light of the foregoing discussion, it should come as no surprise that
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia adopts, on many issues, a formalist
approach. 38 For example, Justice Scalia is a staunch proponent of
"originalism"39 and "textualism."4 For obvious reasons, a formalist
approach lends itself prophetically to an emphasis on textual analysis that
strives to discover the objective or "plain meaning" of the "legal text." 41
For Justice Scalia, when judges stray from the application of "rules" and
engage in policymaking or when they apply discretionary authority, they
sacrifice predictability and fairness in the legal process and threaten

°

derived from the autonomous, logical working out of the system; conceptually
ordered in that ground-level rules could all be derived from a few fundamental
principles; and socially acceptable in that the legal system generated normative
allegiance.

ld. at 607-09. See also Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REv. I (1983)
(cited in Pildes, supra note 32, at 608 n.l).
35
See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Thirteenth Chronicle: Legal Formalism and Law's
Discontents, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1105, 1109 n.l3 (1997); Huhn, supra note 27, at 309-10.
36
See Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of the Law, 97
YALE L.J. 949, 950,953-54 (1988) (citations omitted).
37
!d. at 956.
38
See Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Scalia's Democratic Formalism, 107 YALE L.J. 529,
530-31 (1997) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA, ET AL., A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: fEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW (1997)).
39
!d. at 531, 537 (explaining that Justice Scalia's "basic argument is that the
Constitution's meaning is set not by the original intention but by the original meaning of its
text").
40
!d. at 534-35.
41
Huhn, supra note 27, at 309-11.
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democratic values by imposing judge-made law. 42 It is thus that Justice
Scalia proclaimed: "Of all the criticisms leveled against textualism, the
most mindless is that it is 'formalistic.' The answer to that is, of course
it's formalistic! The rule of law is about form .... Long live formalism.
It is what makes a government a government oflaws and not ofmen."43
The formalist approach has been criticized by many legal thinkers,
including those who are proponents of the doctrine of legal realism. 44
Legal realism surfaced in the early twentieth century as a counterweight
to formalism. 45 Generally, legal realism "implores the recognition of the
use of social condition as a variable in decision making, in lieu of mere
reliance on legal rules which may advance outdated or dysfunctional
policies."46 Legal realists did not reject the application of rules in toto. 47
Professor Joseph William Singer explains that, for the legal realists, a
reliance on legal rules alone was misplaced, because rules often
contained concepts such as "reasonableness" that were subject to varied
interpretations. 48 Moreover, to the realist, a case "could be read in at least
two ways: it could be read broadly to establish a general rule applicable
to a wide range of situations, or it could be read narrowly to apply only to
the specific facts of the case."49 Legal realists recognized that, given the
abstract nature of many legal concepts, legal precedent could be appealed
to in "competing" and "contradictory" ways to resolve, in one way or
another, a particular legal dispute. 5° Thus, a judge's ideology could sway
or influence that judge's view of what facts or law were pertinent to the
42
See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as the Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1186-87 (1989); Sunstein, supra note 38, at 530-31.
43
Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION, supra note 38, at 25 (as quoted by Sunstein, supra note 38, at 531).
44
Richard A. Posner, What has Pragmatism to Offer Law? in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND
LEGAL THEORY: AN ANTHOLOGY, 180-83 (Dennis Patterson, ed., 2003) (identifying Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Benjamin Cardozo, and Jerome Frank as three of the leading proponents of
legal realism).
45
See Huhn, supra note 27, at 309-18.
46
Blake D. Morant, The Teachings of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and Contract Theory:
An Intriguing Comparison, 50 ALA. L. REV. 63, 71 n.39 (1998) (citing G. Edward White,
From Realism to Critical Legal Studies: A Truncated Intellectual History, 40 Sw. L.J. 819,
821 (1986)).
47
!d.
48
Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REv. 467, 470-71 (1988)
(reviewing LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960 (1986)). See also Erwin
Chemerinsky, Seeing the Emperor's Clothes: Recognizing the Reality of Constitutional
Decision Making, 86 B.U. L. REv. 1069, 1070 (2006) ("Reasonableness issues arise in
countless areas of constitutional law, from Fourth Amendment to Equal Protection,
and ... require judgment calls that inescapably are influenced by-if not based on-a judge's
own views and experiences.").
49
Singer, supra note 48, at 4 70 (citing Andrew Altman, Legal Realism, Critical Legal
Studies, and Dworkin, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 208 (1986)).
50
!d. (citing Altman, supra note 49, at 209).
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resolution of the dispute or, more to the point, how to interpret the
pertinent facts or law. 5 1 Professor Singer further explains:
The realists did not believe, however, that the indeterminacy of
legal rules meant that all generalizations are meaningless and that
decisions are controlled only by the psychological make-up of the
judge. Social context, the facts of the case, judges' ideologies,
and professional consensus critically influence individual
judgments and patterns of decisions over time. The realists felt
that study of such factors could improve predictability of
decisions. Moreover, they sought to develop new kinds of
general rules that would be useful in predicting legal outcomes
and in shaping the law better to serve the needs of society. One
goal of realism was to make rules more specific, for example, by
creating different rules for contracts between merchants and
contracts with consumers.
Another way was to replace
formalistic deduction of consequences from abstract concepts
with explicit policy, moral, and institutional analysis. The realists
thought that restructuring law and legal reasoning along these
lines would both make the legal system more predictable and
make the rules better conform to social needs. 52
Whether informed by realism or not, it is worth noting that the Supreme
Court has repeatedly rejected the idea that judges are "mere machines,"
mechanically applying legal doctrines. 53
The idea that a judge must necessarily be all formalist or all realist in
approach, relying on "just the law" or being guided solely by personal
ideology, does not reflect the day-to-day reality of judicial decisionmaking, nor does it represent the desired approach. For Judge Posner, the
judicial approach most descriptive of appellate judges in the American
judiciary is the "pragmatic" approach, which compels the judge to
"decide cases with reasonable dispatch, as best one can .... " 54 In many
51
See, e.g., Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Essay, Democracy and Inclusion: Reconceptualizing
the Role oftheJudge in a Pluralist Polity, 58 MD. L. REv. 150, 197, 199 (1999) (explaining
that the realist or Critical Legal Studies approach recognizes that judges' "ideologies," or the
"unstated assumptions of their common sense of the world, will shape which context judges
find relevant in difficult cases") (citations omitted).
52
Singer, supra note 48, at 470-71 (internal citations omitted).
53
See Lee Anne Fennell, Between Monster and Machine: Rethinking the Judicial
Function, 51 S.C. L. REV. 183, 195 & n.45 (1999) (citing to several Supreme Court opinions
and various dissents using language critical of mechanical considerations or approaches).
54
Posner, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century, supra note 25, at 1053.
Posner has also written about "pragmatism" in other venues. See, e.g., Richard Posner,
Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REv. I (1996); Richard Posner, What Has
Pragmatism to Offer Law, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1653 (1990). In this article, I do not wish to
express an opinion, one way or the other, as to whether "pragmatism" is the philosophy by
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cases, a judge's political leanings as a "conservative" or a "liberal" is a
predictor in that judge's resolution of a dispute. 55 In other cases, a judge
rules inconsistent with his or her "politics"-a reality underlined by
unanimous decisions on politically charged issues. 56 In other words, a
judge may, in some instances, apply "formalistic" approaches while, in
other instances (or even, at times, simultaneously), be guided by
ideological preferences relevant to what the judge believes will advance a
particular societal interest. 57 Professor Wilson Huhn argues that
formalism, analogy (or reasoning by example), and realism should not be
viewed as isolated doctrines but, rather, as "stages of legal reasoning." 58
Professor Huhn further posits that "examination of judicial opinions in
hard cases reveals that courts progress from formalism, to analogy, to
realism, in resolving difficult questions of law. " 59
Moreover, Professor Chemerinsky rightly denounces the "false allure
of formalism" as promising "largely discretion-free judging," when the
exercise of judicial discretion is a crucial part of a judge's role. 60 The
myth of "discretion-free judging" does not, in Chemerinsky's view, take
into account the fact that judges are often called upon to balance
competing interests, e.g., a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial against
the freedom of the press, or the President's interest in executive privilege
and secrecy against the need for evidence at a criminal trial, in order to
render a decision. 61 Similarly, the concept of originalism, which espouses
which judges should ideally guide their decision-making. Rather, I cite to Posner's discussion
to demonstrate that there are models that recognize the interplay between formalistic and
realistic approaches in the dispatch of a judge's duties.
55
Posner, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century, supra note 25, at 1052
(citing, inter alia, Cross, supra note 29, at 1479-82). Cross discusses how judicial selfreporting "provides persuasive support for the political model of . . . decisionmaking," a
model which is based on the principle that "judges are dedicated to advancing their own
personal ideological preferences, which generally fall along a conventional
liberal-to-conservative continuum." Cross, supra note 29, at 1471, 1479.
56
See also Cross, supra note 29, at 1482 (explaining that "while the empirical evidence
on the political model may conflict with the legal model, it is not so strong as to demonstrate
that the legal model has no practical importance").
57
See Posner, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century, supra note 25, at I 053.
See also Fennell, supra note 53.
[D]iscretionary and rules-based approaches to judging can each be dangerous in
isolation. Yet both approaches are indispensable to judging, and are not mutually
exclusive. Instead of quibbling over the relative merits of the worldviews and
philosophical positions that each approach suggests, legal theorists should focus
their efforts on arriving at a workable synthesis.
Jd. at 209.
58
Huhn, supra note 27, at 305.
59
Jd. Huhn is careful to assert that these "stages" do not reflect a hierarchy, such that
any one "stage" is superior to another. Id. at 306.
6
Chemerinsky, supra note 48, at 1070-72.
61
Id. at 1071-72.
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constitutional interpretation "divorced from the value of individual
judges," is, in Chemerinsky's view, flawed, because the original intent of
the framers of the Constitution cannot be divined without resort to
discretion by judges in deciding that intent. 62 Citing as an example, the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Silveira v. Lockyer63 and the Fifth Circuit's
decision in United States v. Emerson, 64 which arrived at opposing
conclusions as to whether the original meaning of the Second
Amendment was to protect an individual's right to possess and bear arms,
Professor Chemerinsky points out that historical quotations may be found
in support of either side of almost any argument regarding constitutional
construction. 65
The argument that "discretion-free" judging, devoid of the influence
of one's identity or experiences, is implausible in a profession populated
by human beings, and not machines, is compelling and shared by many
others who have had occasion to pontificate on the matter, including this
author. Judge Shirley S. Abrahamson, Chief Justice of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, aptly stated:
Judging requires more than such a mechanical application of pure
reason to legal problems. To be sure, legal principles and logic
necessarily influence the outcome of every case. But though they
alone will determine many cases, in other cases they will not
suffice. Principles may admit of more than one interpretation,
conflicting principles may apply, or the application of principles
to the facts may be unclear. In cases such as these, the
blindfolded judge who is blind to the real world in which the
parties live is blind indeed, bereft of a basis on which to make an
intelligent, let alone fair, decision. 66
Notably, Supreme Court justices, on numerous occasions, have expressed
how social identification is relevant to their consideration of a case.
During his confirmation hearings, in response to a comment by
Republican Senator Tom Coburn that Justice Alita had, during the
hearings, been "unfairly criticized" as not caring about the "less
fortunate," the "little guy," or the "weak or the innocent," 67 Justice Alita,
in a poignant expression of empathy, stated:
62

/d. at 1072-73.
312 F .3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2002).
64
270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001).
65
Chemerinsky, supra note 48, at 1072-73.
66
Shirley S. Abrahamson, Commentary on Jeffrey M Shaman's The Impartial Judge:
Detachment or Passion?, 45 DEPAUL L. REv. 633, 641 (1996) (citations omitted).
67
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. A/ito, Jr. to be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 475 (2006).
63
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[W]hen a case comes before me involving, let's say, someone
who is an immigrant, and we get an awful lot of immigration
cases and naturalization cases, I can't help but think of my own
ancestors, because it wasn't that long ago when they were in that
position. And so it's my job to apply the law. It's not my job to
change the law or to bend the law to achieve any result. But
when I look at those cases, I have to say to myself, and I do say to
myself, this could be your grandfather. This could be your
grandmother. They were not citizens at one time, and they were
people who came to this country.
When I have cases involving children, I can't help but think of my
own children and think about my children being treated in the
way that children may be treated in the case that's before me.
And that goes down the line. When I get a case about
discrimination, I have to think about people in my own family
who suffered discrimination because of their ethnic background or
because of religion or because of gender, and I do take that into
account. When I have a case involving someone who's been
subjected to discrimination because of disability, I have to think
of people who I've known and admired very greatly who had
disabilities and I've watched them struggle to overcome the
barriers that society puts up often just because it doesn't think of
what it's doing, the barriers that it puts up to them.

***

So those are some of the experiences that have shaped me as a
person. 68
Justice O'Connor also recognized that the "revolution in the legal
profession," in terms of the representation of women as law school
graduates, lawyers and judges, was "due in large part to the explosion of
the myth of the 'True Woman' through the efforts ofreal women and the
insights of real men." 69 According to Justice O'Connor, "[t]his change in
perspective has been reflected, as most social change eventually is, in the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence."70 Even Justice O'Connor's statement
that a "wise old man" and a "wise old woman" may reach the same
conclusion, as articulated, reflected her understanding that wisdom may
be attained through the diversity of struggles that face people of various
backgrounds:
Jd.
Sandra Day O'Connor, Madison Lecture: Portia's Progress, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1546,
1548-49 (1991 ).
70
ld. at 1549.
68
69

16

University of Baltimore Law Forum

[Vol. 40.1

Do women judges decide cases differently by virtue of being
women? I would echo the answer of my colleague, Justice Jeanne
Coyne of the Supreme Court of [Minnesota]/ 1 who responded
that "a wise old man and a wise old woman reach the same
conclusion." This should be our aspiration: that, whatever our
gender or background, we all may become wise-wise through
our different struggles and different victories, wise through work
and play, profession and family. 72
Justice Ginsburg adds:
Judge Jeanne Coyne, who was on the Supreme Court of
Minnesota, which I think was the first state Supreme Court to
have a majority of women, once said, "A wise old man and a wise
old woman will reach the same judgment." I think that is true.
But we also bring to the table our life's experience, which is
different. A very important difference: Are you male? Are you
female? Are you a girl from the golden west? Or are you a kid
who grew up in Brooklyn? All of those differences, I think, make
the Supreme Court bench, make all the benches in the country,
ever so much better than they were when only one kind of person
sat in the seat ofjudgment. 73
II. WHY PERSONAL EXPERIENCES MATTER: THE ROLE OF EMPATHY AND
COLLEGIALITY IN JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING

As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the purported aversion to
the incorporation of Judge Sotomayor's background and experience into
her decision-making, as expressed by those who opposed Judge
Sotomayor's confirmation, reveals a view of the judge's role that is
disproportionately influenced by principles often associated with strict
formalism. Because a judge will typically apply approaches identified
both with formalism and realism, it follows that the denigration of relying
exclusively on one's personal experiences in judicial decision-making is
not borne out by what actually takes place. Simply put, it represents a
point of view that does not comport with the reality of being a judge.
More importantly, this author postulates that the ability to tune into
one's personal background and life experiences and the associated ability
71

Justice Mary Jeanne Coyne was an associate justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court.
Minnesota State Law Library, Docket Series: Biographies of Justices and Judges of the
Minnesota Appellate Courts, http://www.lawlibrary.state.rnn.us/judgebio.html#coyne (last
visited Nov. 24, 2009).
72
O'Connor, supra note 69, at 1558 (emphasis added).
73
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg Distinguished Lecture on Women and the Law: A
Conversation with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 56 REc. OF THE Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE
CITYOFN.Y. 9, 16-17 (2001).
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to empathize with the circumstances and world-view of others is, indeed,
integral to a judge's ability to reach an appropriate conclusion in a given
case. In the context of judicial decision-making, empathy, which, at its
core, involves the ability to understand the life experiences or emotions of
another person, 74 need not mean "intuition" nor should it be perceived as
injecting the "mystical" into the ordered resolution of disputes. 75 Rather,
as Professor Lynne Henderson explains, "empathy enables the
decisionmaker to have an appreciation of the human meanings of a given
legal situation," ultimately aiding the judge both in the process of
reaching a legal conclusion and in justifying that conclusion "in a way
that disembodied reason simply cannot."76 Moreover, the fact that a
judge has the ability to empathize with human beings involved in a legal
dispute does not mean that the judge is, thus, unable to decide the case in
a fair and impartial manner. Professor Catherine Gage O'Grady explains:
Although empathy is sometimes used interchangeably with
compassion, sympathy, and pity, empathy as a component of
judicial decisionmaking does not mean experiencing sympathy or
pity for another and allowing that sympathy to shape an outcome.
Empathy in judging is not predictive of outcome-it is part of a
process, but it does not carry the day. When a judge proceeds to
apply the law and judicially assess a case that is empathically
understood, the fact that the judge has achieved empathic
understandings may or may not affect the eventual outcome of the
case. With respect to judicial decisionmaking, empathy is an
important part of the process, not because it may have an impact
on the result, but because the incorporation of empathy in judicial

74
Professor Lynne Henderson, describes the word "empathy" as encompassing three
basic phenomena:

(1) feeling the emotion of another; (2) understanding the experience or situation of
another, both affectively and cognitively, often achieved by imagining oneself to be
in the position of the other; and (3) action brought about by experiencing the distress
of another (hence the confusion of empathy with sympathy and compassion). The
first two forms are ways of knowing, the third form a catalyst for action.
Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1574, 1579 (1987). MerriamWebster's Collegiate Dictionary defines "empathy," in part, as "the action of understanding,
being aware of, being sensitive to, and vicariously experiencing the feelings, thoughts, and
experience of another of either the past or present without having the feelings, thoughts, and
experience fully communicated in an objectively explicit marmer." MERRIAM-WEBSTER's
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 408 (11th ed. 2004).
75
Henderson, supra note 74, at 1576.
76
!d.

18

University of Baltimore Law Forum

[Vol. 40.1

decisionmaking will provide a judge with new understandings
and enhanced knowledge of context with which to assess a case. 77
That we all perceive through the prism of our own unique experiences
is beyond cavil. The proper exercise of empathy, for those who exercise
authority and wield power over others, in no sense diminishes their ability
to make provident, even harsh, decisions. On the other hand, the inability
of judges to empathize with individuals subject to their judgment, may, in
some instances, result in decisions that reflect only the cloistered
perspective of a jurist, disconnected from the everyday experiences of the
less fortunate.
A. The Power ofDissent:
Experiences with Poverty and Discrimination

The dissents of distinguished Supreme Court Justice Thurgood
Marshall reflect a judge's ability to impart to his or her colleagues an
understanding of the disparate realities of litigants before the Court,
thereby fostering decisions more sensitive to the realities of the litigants
and, at times, resulting in outcomes altered by the dissenting view. For
example, in United States v. Kras, 78 Justice Marshall challenged the
majority's denial of an indigent bankruptcy petitioner's argument that the
imposition of filing fees violated his due process rights. 79 Kras, beset by
poverty and misfortune, resided in a two and one-half bedroom apartment
with his wife, two children, his mother, and his mother's child. 80 His
eight-month old child was undergoing medical treatment for cystic
fibrosis. 81 He was unemployed, after having been discharged by a life
insurance company when the premiums collected by him were stolen
from his home. 82 He and his family survived on $366 in monthly public
assistance, all of which was expended for rent and basic necessities. 83
Among his assets, which were of negligible value, Kras owned a couch in
storage, for which a six-dollar payment was due monthly. 84 Kras sought
a discharge from his debts in bankruptcy and asked for a waiver of the
77

Catherine Gage O'Grady, Empathy and Perspective in Judging: The Honorable
William C. Canby, Jr., 33 ARiz. ST. L.J. 4, 10-11 (2001) (internal citations omitted).
78
409 u.s. 434 (1973).
79
Id. at 458-63 (Marshall, J., dissenting). For a general discussion of the Kras decision
and Justice Marshall's dissent, see Karen Gross, In Forma Pauperis in Bankruptcy: Reflecting
On and Beyond United States v. Kras, 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 57, 58-61 (1994). For a
perspective on how Justice Marshall's dissent may have had an impact on subsequent opinions
by Justice Blackmun, see Gay Gellhom, Justice Thurgood Marshall's Jurisprudence of Equal
Protection ofthe Laws and the Poor, 26 ARiz. ST. L.J. 429,453-56 (1994).
8
Kras, 409 U.S. at 437-38.
81
/d. at 437.
82
/d.
83
Id. at 438.
84 /d.
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$50 bankruptcy filing fee, which the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York granted, in part, on the grounds that the
85
imposition of such a fee violated his due process rights. Five justices of
the Supreme Court disagreed with Kras, in an opinion authored by Justice
Blackmun. 86 In his dissent, Justice Marshall cited census figures
pertaining to the annual incomes of the poor and derided the majority for
the ease with which they assumed a person in Kras' position could obtain
additional income:
It may be easy for some people to think that weekly savings of
less than $2 are no burden. But no one who has had close contact
with poor people can fail to understand how close to the margin
of survival many of them are. A sudden illness, for example, may
destroy whatever savings they may have accumulated, and by
eliminating a sense of security may destroy the incentive to save
in the future. A pack or two of cigarettes may be, for them, not a
routine purchase but a luxury indulged in only rarely. The
desperately poor almost never go to see a movie, which the
majority seems to believe is an almost weekly activity. They
have more important things to do with what little money they
have-like attempting to provide some comforts for a gravely ill
child, as Kras must do.
It is perfectly proper for judges to disagree about what the
Constitution requires. But it is disgraceful for an interpretation of
the Constitution to be premised upon unfounded assumptions
about how people live. 87

Justice Marshall was undoubtedly motivated by his personal background
and experiences with the poor to remind a majority of the Court of the
disconnect between the Court's tone and the realities of those in Kras'
position.
So, too, was Justice Stevens motivated in his dissenting opinion in
California v. Hodari D., 88 a dissent joined by Justice Marshall, to
question the majority's "gratuitous quotation" to Proverbs 28:1 ("The
wicked flee when no man pursueth"), when the majority, notwithstanding
the government's concession that an officer in that case lacked reasonable
suspicion to stop Hodari, stated, without deciding the point: "That it
would be unreasonable to stop, for brief inquiry, young men who scatter
in panic upon the mere sighting of the police is not self-evident, and

85

86
87
88

!d. at 435-36,440-41.
Kras, 409 U.S. at 435-50.
!d. at 460 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
499 u.s. 621 (1991).
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arguably contradicts proverbial common sense." 89 According to the
dissent, the majority's assumption that an innocent person would not run
upon sight of a police officer represented an "ivory-towered analysis of
the real world" that failed to take into account the experience of many
people, particularly minorities. 90
The foregoing is indicative of how the presence of those with
perspectives informed by direct or indirect experiences with poverty or
racial discrimination, and the ability to empathize with litigants as a result
of those experiences, are critical to a robust debate on the Court. 91
Indeed, "racial homogeneity on the bench may limit the depth and scope
of judicial decision-making.',n Justice Marshall's ability to empathize
and to remind his colleagues on the Court when their failure to do so
rendered their decisions less sound, was invaluable. In recognition of the
impact that Justice Marshall's moral clarity had on the court, Justice
O'Connor proclaimed:
Although all of us come to the Court with our own personal
histories and experiences, Justice Marshall brought a special
perspective. His was the eye of a lawyer who saw the deepest
wounds in the social fabric and used law to help heal them. His
was the ear of a counselor who understood the vulnerabilities of
the accused and established safeguards for their protection. His
was the mouth of a man who knew the anguish of the silenced
and gave them a voice.
At oral arguments and conference meetings, in opinions and
dissents, Justice Marshall imparted not only his legal acumen but
also his life experiences, constantly pushing and prodding us to
respond not only to the persuasiveness of legal argument but also
to the power of moral truth. 93
According to Justice White, Justice Marshall "brought to the
conference table years of experience in an area that was of vital
importance to our work, experience that none of us could claim to
match," such that he would "tell us things that we knew but would rather
forget; and he told us much that we did not know due to the limitations of
89

I d. at 621 n.l,
/d. at 630 n.4 (Stevens, J ., dissenting).
91
See Julian Abele Cook, Jr., Dream Makers: Black Judges on Justice, 94 MICH. L. REv.
1479, 1483-84 (1996) (reviewing LINN WASHINGTON, BLACK JUDGES ON JUSTICE (1994));
Gellhom, supra note 79, at 430-31.
92
Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public
Confidence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 405, 434 (2000).
93
Sandra Day O'Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The lrifluence of a Raconteur, 44 STAN. L.
REv. 1217 (1992).
90
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our own experience."94 Other colleagues on the Court shared these
perspectives. 95
On a more personal note relevant to the importance of experience and
empathy in the role of a judge, the prism through which AfricanAmericans have peered over the years, notwithstanding gains never
thought to be possible just a few years ago, is one which is certainly
different from those of the majority society, African-Americans being the
only citizens subjected to racial discrimination sanctioned by the so called
"Jim Crow" laws. 96 Although I am aware of no studies of the influence
of the life experiences of African-American judges on their decisionmaking and I would never presume to have an insight as to any such
relationship, 97 examples from the experiences of Justice Marshall, my
experiences, and the experiences of two former members of my Court
provide support, I submit, for the proposition that such experiences serve
to sensitize minority judges to issues growing out of their personal
experiences without compromising their ability to decide cases in a fair
and impartial manner, anchored by the rule of law.
David T. Mason, the first African-American judge appointed to the
Maryland Court of Special Appeals, 98 while an attorney, refused to
submit to a "frisk" by a Baltimore City police officer as he, two male, and
two female friends sat at a table in a local nightclub on Sunday, February
15, 1953, at 1:30 in the moming. 99 Complying with an order by a
Baltimore City police sergeant to stand, Mason reiterated his refusal to be
searched, but was frisked over his objection. 100 After a Baltimore City
trial judge entered judgment in favor of the police sergeant on Mason's
claims of assault and battery and false imprisonment, the Maryland Court
of Appeals reversed the judgment of the lower court, mandating,
however, only nominal damages. 101 On another occasion, in clearly a
triumphant moment, Judge Mason returned as the head of the Maryland
Employment Security Administration, an agency that had just a few years
before, because of the racial policies of the agency, ordered that he not, as
an employee, have contact with the public. 102
94

Byron R. White, A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1215,
1216 (1992).
95
See Gellhom, supra note 79, at 452 nn.164-65, 453 n.166.
96
C. V ANN Woo ow ARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 7 (Oxford Univ. Press, Inc.
2002).
97
But see Cook, supra note 91.
98
Frederick N. Rasmussen, David Mason, 88, Cabinet Secretary, First Black Appellate
Jud~e in Md., BALT. SUN, Nov. 18, 2003, at 7B.
9
Mason v. Wrightson, 205 Md. 481, 485, 109 A.2d 128, 129 (1954).
100 !d.
101
/d. at 489, 109 A.2d at 132.
102
At a memorial service held by the Court of Special Appeals on January 27, 2004, on
the occasion of Judge Mason's death, over which the writer of this article presided, former
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In 1961, at the age of sixteen, Robert M. Bell, currently the Chief
Judge of Maryland's highest Court, the Court of Appeals, was arrested,
along with eleven other protesters, for trespass on private property as a
result of engaging in a sit-in demonstration at Hooper's Restaurant in
downtown Baltimore, Maryland. 103 The defendants were fined ten dollars
by the Criminal Court of Baltimore. 104 After appeals filed by Tucker R.
Dearing and civil rights attorney Juanita Jackson Mitchell, who were
joined by Thurgood Marshall and Jack Greenberg on the brief, the Court
of Appeals rejected the appellants' contention that, once an owner has
opened his or her property to the general public, resort to the Maryland
Criminal Trespass Statute, constitutional on its face, was an
unconstitutional application of the law. 105 These events were the impetus
for the Equal Accommodations Law enacted by the Maryland General
Assembly in 1964. 106 Because of the new statute, which was enacted
prior to the deliberations on this case, the Supreme Court of the United
States, which had granted certiorari, ultimately declined to consider the
petitioners' constitutional arguments and vacated the judgments,
remanding to the Court of Appeals of Maryland for reconsideration of the
convictions in light of the new law. 107 Although the protagonists in Bell
v. State did not prevail in the Court of Appeals' second consideration of
their case, 108 their efforts were more than pyrrhic. While the Court of
Appeals' second consideration of Bell v. State affirmed the judgments
against the protestors, the protestors' petition for rehearing, filed
approximately one month after the Court affirmed the judgments on
remand, was granted. 109 On April 9, 1965, the Court reversed the
Governor Marvin Mandel recounted how Judge Mason had endured the ignominy of being
told that, because of racial policies of the agency, he was not to have contact with the public,
including processing applications or taking complaints over the phone, as an employee of the
Maryland Employment Security Administration, and how he returned triumphantly, as the
head of that agency, having been appointed by Governor Mandel.
103
Bell v. State, 227 Md. 302,303-04, 176 A.2d 771 (1962); see also Bell v. Maryland,
378 U.S. 226,227-28 (1964); Bell v. State, 236 Md. 356, 358,204 A.2d 54,55 (1964). For a
thorough discussion of this particular case, see William L. Reynolds, Foreward: The Legal
History of the Great Sit-In Case ofBell v. Maryland, 61 Mo. L. REv. 761 (2002), and see also
John Carroll Byrnes, Commemorative Histories of the Bench and Bar: In Celebration of the
Bicentennial ofBaltimore City 1797-I997, 27 U. BALT. L.F. 5, 17-19, 17 n.140 (1997).
104
Bell, 227 Md. at 303-04, 176 A.2d at 771.
105
Id. at 303-05, 176 A.2d at 771-72.
106
See Act of Apr. 7, 1964, ch. 29, 1964 Md. Laws 50-51 (codified as amended at Mo.
CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 20-304 (2009)).
107
Bell, 378 U.S. at 239-40, 242; see also Bell, 236 Md. at 358, 204 A.2d at 55.
108
Bell, 236 Md. at 369, 204 A.2d at 61.
109
Reynolds, supra note 103, at 793.
When I got this far in my reading for this Article, I realized that I had missed
something. The decision by the Court of Appeals discussed in the proceeding
paragraphs had affirmed the convictions. But I knew that the convictions had been
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judgments. 110
Justice Marshall, long before his elevation to the Supreme Court in
1967, represented a young 1934 graduate of Amherst College, Donald G.
Murray, who had sought-but was denied-admission to the University
of Maryland School of Law. 111 The Law School appealed from an order
by the Baltimore City Court, directing the issuance of a writ of
mandamus and ordering the Law School to admit Murray. 112 Citing the
State's legal obligation to offer equal treatment in the discharge of its
function of educating its citizens, the Court of Appeals ordered that
Murray be admitted. 113 Ironically, a few years earlier, because the
University of Maryland School of Law did not admit African-American
applicants, Justice Marshall himself had not sought admission. 114 Over
forty years later, still vexed by the Law School's refusal to admit AfricanAmericans, Justice Marshall would decline an invitation to a dedication
ceremony, in which the newly constructed University of Maryland School
of Law Library was named after him. 115
overturned; or, at least, so went local lore. Obviously, my research assistant, a very
able student, I might add, had not pulled all of the cases. So, I Shepardized the case
myself. To my astonishment, there was no further decision by the Court of Appeals,
no reversal following a petition for rehearing.
Eventually, I read the official report of the decision in the Maryland Reporter. (I had
been using an online printout of the case from the Atlantic Reporter.) Still nothing.
Finally, however, a meticulous re-reading discovered the following. In the
Maryland Reporter, the report of the decision on remand lists, as it always does,
counsel for the parties; that listing is followed by the date of the decision and the
opinions themselves. But if the reader looks very carefully at the report of Bell v.
Maryland, she will find the following unusual if not unique entry (reprinted in full):
Decided October 22, 1964
Petition for rehearing filed November 23, 1964, granted December 7,
1964, and reversed April9, 1965.
This entry is missing from the report of the remand in the Atlantic Reporter. A
researcher, in other words, would know of the reversal only from a very careful
reading of the Maryland Reporter, an event most unlikely to happen.
I d.
110

Jd. at 794.
Pearson v. Murray, 169 Md. 478,480, 182 A. 590,590 (1936).
112
I d., 182 A. at 590-91.
113
I d. at 489, 182 A. at 594.
114
See U.W. Clemon & Bryan K. Fair, Lawyers, Civil Disobedience, and Equality in the
Twenty-First Century: Lessons from Two American Heroes, 54 ALA. L. REv. 959, 973 (2003).
115
See BRENDA HAUGEN, THURGOOD MARSHALL: CiVIL RIGHTS LAWYER AND SUPREME
COURT JUSTICE 33-34 (Mari Bolte ed., Compass Point Books 2007).
111

The University of Maryland Law School was just a few blocks from Marshall's
home in Baltimore. Tuition rates were low, and it had a good reputation as a public
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The above accounts of notable African-American judges are
illustrations of resort to the legal process occasioned by violations of civil
rights disproportionately experienced by African-Americans and other
minorities, in light of the history of segregation and institutionalized
racism in this country. Who better to be an umpire than contestants who
have zealously competed within the framework of the rules and have
changed those very rules? The most prominent example of such
contestants, who demonstrated remarkable skill in utilizing the rules of
the game, i.e., the legal system, thereby becoming eminently qualified to
be decision-makers, was the legal team assembled by Charles Hamilton
Houston, including former President and Dean of the Howard University
School of Law, James Nabrit, Spotsworth Robinson and Robert Carter.
Notably, the team, which ultimately produced such noted jurists as Justice
Marshall, A. Leon Higginbotham, and William Hastie, of course, devised
the groundbreaking strategy in the presentation of the petitioners' case in
Brown v. Board of Education. Aside from the need to resort to the legal
process, virtually every person of color can recount dozens of instances in
which he or she has been stereotyped by strangers according to the degree
of exposure to and familiarity within their communities.
Other
experiences rooted in one's socioeconomic status may also impact the
experiences of African-Americans more severely. African-American
judges will, accordingly, bring these experiences to the bench. 116 As
Professor Sherillyn Ifill has observed, the notion that the rest of society is
subject to cultural and ideological influences regarding race while judges
are passed by is an anomaly. 117 For example, while the AfricanAmerican community is by no means monolithic, 118 African-American
judges are arguably more likely to have been "exposed to more varied
experiences across race and class lines than their white counterparts," as
school that educated its students well. Marshall very much wanted to go there, but
he didn't bother to apply. The school made turning away blacks a common practice.
/d. He was accepted at Howard University Law School, where he matriculated, although he
felt that a degree from Maryland would do more to advance his legal career. /d. Still peeved
decades later that he was unable to attend the University of Maryland Law School, Marshall
declined an invitation to the ceremony in 1980 naming the law library after him. JUAN
WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AN AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY 371-72 (Times Books
1998). When school officials invited other members of the Court to attend the ceremonies,
Marshall, in writing a memo to the justices urging them not to go, stated '"I will not be there
and I have made this clear to them from the beginning' .... 'I am very certain that Maryland
is trying to salve its conscience for excluding the Negroes from the University of Maryland for
such a long period of time."' /d. at 372 (citing Memorandum from Thurgood Marshall to
Conference, Marshall Papers, Supreme Court (July 31, 1980) (on file with the Library of
Conress)).
11
Ifill, supra note 92, at 434-36.
117
/d. at431-32.
118
/d. at 414,420-21.
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African-American communities are disproportionately impacted by
poverty. 119 As such, the chances are that the African-American judge has
a greater familiarity with litigants in distressed economic circumstances
and persons living in single-parent households. 120
This is not to suggest that sensitivity to issues of race and class is the
exclusive province of African-Americans or other traditionally
marginalized groups. For members of the majority community, however,
predisposition to serve the interests of that community and one's own
interests may, if not otherwise tempered by competing viewpoints,
interfere with the proclivity to be sensitive to issues that affect others.
The comments of Justice Marshall's colleagues on the Supreme Court,
which are quoted supra, illustrate this point. 121 More recently, Justice
Ginsburg was motivated to publicly state that, during the course of the
deliberations in Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding, 122 some of
her male colleagues on the bench, in the view of Justice Ginsburg,
seemed unable to appreciate the sensitivity of a thirteen-year-old girl who
was strip-searched by school authorities on suspicion that she was hiding
ibuprofen in her underwear. 123 In an eight-to-one decision, the Court
ultimately held that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. 124
Apropos, Justice Ginsburg expressed her preference that a woman be
appointed to the seat vacated by retiring Justice Souter. 125
Nor does the foregoing discussion suggest that those sensitive to these
experiences are unable to judge cases fairly and impartially, a point made

119

!d. at429-32, 469.
Professor Ifill references a survey of black and white federal judges, where "83% of
white judges surveyed believe that black litigants are treated fairly in the justice system, while
only 18% of black judges share that belief." !d. at 436 (citing KEVIN L. LYLES, THE
GATEKEEPERS: FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS 21, 23 7 (1997)).
121
See supra Part li.A.
122
129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009).
123
Robert Barnes, Student Strip Search Illegal: School Violated Teen Girl's Rights,
Supreme Court Rules, WASH. POST, June 26, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/25/AR200906250 1690.html.
124
Safford Unified School District #I, 129 S. Ct. at 2644. One wonders whether the
matter of the justices' sensitivity to the humiliation of a thirteen-year old girl in these
circumstances would ever have become public if Justice Ginsburg's colleagues had
demonstrated, from the outset, what, in Justice Ginsburg's view, was the appropriate degree of
sensitivity to the issue. Ultimately, the Court determined that the search of the thirteen-yearold did constitute a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights. Without having been within
those hallowed walls, we cannot know the effect of Justice Ginsburg's public expression of
concern on the Court's final outcome.
125
See Joan Biskupic, Ginsburg: Court Needs Another Woman, USA TODAY, May 5,
2009, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/2009-05-05-ruthginsburg_N.htrn;
Joan Biskupic, Ginsburg 'lonely' without 0 'Connor: The remaining female justice fears
message sent by court composition, USA TODAY, Jan. 25, 2007, at lA,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007 -0 1-25-ginsburg-court_ x.htm.
120
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by Professor Ifill in her discussion of diversity and impartiality. 126 In the
interest of full disclosure, Judge Mason was a mentor and close friend
until his passing at eighty-seven years of age and my association with
Chief Judge Bell extends over a period in excess of forty years.
Nevertheless, an examination of the decisions that Judge Mason authored
reveals that his decisions are all grounded on settled law and do not
reflect any tendency, in the absence of a sound legal basis, to favor
defendants in criminal appeals, notwithstanding what he referred to, in
submissions to the Court of Appeals in Mason v. Wrightson, 127 as an
"humiliating" experience. 128 The same may be said of Chief Judge Bell,
whose opinions, while often in dissent, are a model of clarity and
supported by sound legal authority. 129 The salient point is that their
personal experiences and their experiences as lawyers in employing the
very legal system that had proven to be a barrier to realizing justice
rendered them more sensitive than most to other points of view. Their
personal experiences, like those of Justice Marshall, indeed served to
126

See Ifill, supra note 92, at 458-62.
205 Md. 481, 109 A.2d 128 (1954).
128
/d. at 489, 109 A.2d at 132.
129
See, e.g., Chief Judge Bell's dissenting opinions in: Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md. 219,
932 A.2d 571 (2007) (dissent challenging the application of rational basis review to the State's
marriage statute pointing out that the court had previously held that sex-based classifications
are entitled to the same review as race-based classifications and that it has been determined
that marriage is a fundamental right that should not be denied based on the historical denial of
the right to certain groups); Suessmann v. Lamone, 383 Md. 697, 862 A.2d 1 (2004) (rejecting
the majority's conclusion that "the procedure for electing [circuit court] judges remains [in
Maryland] a partisan one in form and in substance" and thus voters unaffiliated with
established political parties are not permitted to vote in primary elections for judicial
candidates, the dissenting opinion posits that, to preserve the integrity judicial elections, such
selections are nonpartisan and, had the argument been made that Article I, Section 1
precludes the exclusion of unaffiliated registered voters from primary elections for circuit
court judges, it would have been "persuasive."); Langston v. Riffe, 359 Md. 396, 754 A.2d
389 (2000) (dissent challenging the majority's departure from the legislative history of the
statute and the Court's past position of protecting the finality of declarations of paternity and
serving the best interest of the child in holding that a legislative amendment entitles all with
an order declaring paternity prior to October 1, 1995 without a genetic test to reopen
proceedings and demand a blood test to determine paternity); Ayers v. State, 335 Md. 602,
645 A.2d 22 (1994) (In a hate crime case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and
Chief Judge Bell dissented, challenging the majority's decision upholding the admission of
"other crimes evidence" of defendant's exchange of racial epithets with a group of AfricanAmerican men several days before the crime. In dissent, Chief Judge Bell challenged the
admissibility of the evidence, explaining that the hate crimes statute proscribes selection of a
victim on the basis of race and not bigotry itself. Although the testimony regarding the earlier
incident may have been probative of the defendant's bigotry, its probative value was not
outweighed by its prejudicial effect because the evidence was not offered to prove motive, but
rather, to prove defendant's bigotry, which is not an element of the crime. Moreover, the
dissent challenged the admissibility of the other crimes evidence rebuttal evidence as it did not
explain, directly apply to or contradict any new matter material to the issue before the trial
court.).
127
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enhance perspectives particularly suited to employment of the established
judicial process in "making" law and in keeping with contemporary
societal norms.
For most African-Americans, the repeated occurrences of such
incidents over a lifetime are troubling. Nonetheless, tempering and
balancing the inevitable and justifiable feelings of injustice and
resentment are the positive relations borne out of familiarity with
members of other ethnic, religious and professional backgrounds, and
socioeconomic strata, including, of course, particularly, in the case of
African-American judges, other judges and law enforcement officials.
More importantly, as will be developed more thoroughly in Part III of this
article, a judge's personal experiences and the ability to empathize based
on experiences of discrimination or injustice shared by those whose cases
they judge must be anchored by adherence to, and respect for, the rule of
law. It is imperative that the rule of law, in the final analysis, have
relevance to all who must be governed by it.
B. Judge Sonia Sotomayor's Record and Ricci v. DeStefano
The impetus of this article is the degree to which Judge Sonia
Sotomayor was maligned by some for her previous comments reflecting
her identification with the Latino experience of discrimination based on
ethnic and class background and the criticism of President Obama's
pronouncement that he would appoint a Supreme Court Justice who
would employ the quality of "empathy" in his or her judicial decisionmakingY0 The preceding section is an explication of how a judge brings
to the process of adjudication his or her personal experiences and the
ability to empathize; and that introduction into judicial deliberations
provides a perspective that encourages colleagues to give consideration to
views at odds with their own. As Justice Marshall's jurisprudence
demonstrates, we may learn as much about the merits of a decision by the
majority opinion as we may by the dissent. 131 We may also learn about
the motivations behind our own decisions or the soundness of our own
legal reasoning by testing it against competing viewpoints.
No one has suggested, during Judge Sotomayor's confirmation or the
aftermath, that she is not eminently qualified, by scholarship, legal
training, and judicial experience, to be a Supreme Court Justice.
Moreover, the efforts to make the case for how Judge Sotomayor's
socioeconomic background and previous comments as to the role of a
judge affect her ability to be impartial are unsustainable. In fact, those
130
Jerry Markon, Obama's Empathy Standard Drawing Heat, WASH. POST, May 21,
2009, http://voices. washingtonpost.com/supreme-court/2009/05/obamas_empathy_standard_
drawin.html.
131
See supra Part Il.A.
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who opposed Judge Sotomayor's confirmation may be affected by what
Professor Chemerinsky argues to be the false allure of formalism, 132 so
much so that they incorrectly attributed the Second Circuit's decision in
Ricci v. DeStefano 133 to what they perceived to be Judge Sotomayor's
lack of impartiality, concluding incorrectly that the panel decision
demonstrated her bias. I offer the following amplification.
In questioning Judge Sotomayor regarding her seventeen-year judicial
record, the decision which received the greatest scrutiny was Ricci v.
DeStefano, termed by some in the media as a "reverse discrimination"
case. 134 The focus of the scrutiny was not only on her participation in the
decision of the panel of the United States Second Circuit Court of
Appeals in ruling against the eighteen firefighter protagonists (seventeen
of whom were white and one of whom was Latino), but also what some
of the members of the Judiciary Committee deemed the dismissive
manner in which the panel simply adopted the decision of the District
Court and then voted to deny plaintiffs' motion for a rehearing of the
circuit court's opinion. 135
The genesis of the Ricci case was a promotional test administered to
firefighters. 136 After the test at issue was administered, City of New
Haven officials invalidated the test, believing it to have had a disparate
racial impact since none of the African-American firefighters who took
the test scored high enough to qualify for promotions. 137 The City argued
that it would be in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 138 to
certify these test results because of their disparate impact 139 on minority
firefighters. 140 The eighteen firefighters described above challenged this
action on the grounds that they were improperly denied promotions on
the basis of race, in violation of the disparate treatment provisions in Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act and their Equal Protection rights under the
132

Chemerisnky, supra note 48, at 1070-73.
530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008), reh 'g denied en bane, 530 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2008), rev 'd,
129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
134
See, e.g., Warren Richey, U.S. Supreme Court Takes Up 'Reverse Discrimination'
Case,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Jan.
9,
2009, http://www.csmonitor.com/
2009/01 09/p25s30-usju.html.
135
See, e.g., Chairman's Opening Statements, Kyl Questions Sotomayor at Supreme Court
Nomination Hearings, WASH. PosT, July 16, 2009, http://www. washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2009/07116/AR200907160 151 O.html.
136
Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2664.
137 !d.
138
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. 2000e (2006)).
139
The Court explained in Ricci: "Title VII prohibits both intentional discrimination
(known as 'disparate treatment') as well as, in some cases, practices that are not intended to
discriminate but in fact have a disproportionately adverse effect on minorities (known as
'disparate impact')." Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2672.
140 !d.
133
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Fourteenth Amendment. 141 The United States District Court granted
summary judgment against the firefighters 142 and a three-judge panel of
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which included Judge Sotomayor,
affirmed this ruling in a summary order, without issuing a separate
opinion. 143 After a judge on the Circuit requested an en bane hearing for
the case, the panel withdrew its summary order and issued a oneparagraph, per curiam opinion affirming the District Court. 144 A few
days later, the Court of Appeals, in a seven-to-six vote, denied a
rehearing en banc. 145 That decision was opposed in a dissent authored by
Chief Judge Cabranes. 146
The United States Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision authored
by Justice Kennedy, concluded that the City ofNew Haven violated Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act. 147 According to the Court, a "race-based
action like the City's in this case is impermissible under Title VII unless
the employer can demonstrate a strong basis in evidence that, had it not
taken the action, it would have been liable under the disparate-impact
statute." 148 While the District Court and the Second Circuit held that the
City's invalidation of the test results could not be found to have violated
the disparate treatment provisions of Title VII because the City was
motivated to do so by its belief that the test had a racially disparate
impact, the Supreme Court held that the City's actions would violate the
disparate treatment provisions absent a valid defense. 149 In so ruling, the
Court announced a "strong-basis-in-evidence" standard related to
resolving what the majority determined to be competing disparate-impact
and disparate-treatment provisions, allowing violation of the latter in
order to avoid the former only in "certain, narrow circumstances." 150
The dissent by four of the justices, authored by Justice Ginsburg, (1)
outlined the history of racial discrimination and the decades of efforts
under Title VII to "open firefighting posts to members of racial
minorities," 151 (2) challenged the majority's determination that there was
a conflict between the disparate-impact and disparate-treatment
provisions, 152 (3) asserted that both provisions aimed to "end[] workplace
141

!d. at 2671.
Ricci v. Destefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D. Conn. 2006).
143
Ricci v. Destefano, 530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008).
144
Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2672.
145
!d.
146
Ricci, 530 F.3d at 93 (en bane) (Cabranes, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge Cabranes was
joined by Judge Raggi, Judge Wesley, Judge Hall, and Judge Livingston in the dissent. !d.
147
Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2664-81.
148
!d. at 2664.
149
!d. at 2673-74.
150
!d. at 2676.
151
!d. at 2689-90.
152
!d. at 2690.
142
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discrimination and promot[e] genuinely equal opportunity," and (4)
characterized the majority's ruling, that an employer changing an
employment practice in an effort to comply with Title VII disparate
impact provisions acted because of race, as paying little attention to the
purpose behind the Act. 153 The dissent further criticized the "newly
announced" standard for drawing upon inapposite Equal Protection
precedents. 154
An in-depth analysis of the factual and legal complexities of this case
is beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that Judge
Sotomayor's decision, as part of a three-judge panel in the Ricci case,
affirming the decision of the District Court, was supported by a number
of distinguished jurists. 155 I take no position as to whether the position
taken by Judge Sotomayor reveals that she was influenced by anything
other than the facts of the case; she, for her part, denied any partiality. 156
Other colleagues on the Second Circuit, in voting to deny a rehearing,
argued that the District Court's decision, and the Second Circuit's
summary affirmance, was consistent with well-established precedent in
the circuit. 157 More importantly, even if her vote in the Ricci case
reflected Judge Sotomayor's world view, there is no indication that her
decision in Ricci, shared by her other panel members, or that Justice
Ginsburg's dissent, shared by three other distinguished justices of the
Court, were the product of a lack of impartiality or fell outside the realm
of reasoned and thoughtful jurisprudence based on the applicable
precedent and the rule of law. Rather, reasonable minds differed as to the
interpretation of applicable law; that the Supreme Court announced a new
standard, as a result of the case, is undisputed. 158 The process illustrated
the contest of diverse viewpoints which were challenged and ultimately
Thus, the insistence of Judge
resolved by the Supreme Court.
Sotomayor's opponents on ascribing to the Ricci case evidence of her
lack of impartiality was, in light of her seventeen-year record, nebulous at
best.

153

Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2699.
!d. at 2700-01.
155
Ricci, 530 F.3d at 87. Judge Pooler and Judge Sack joined Judge Sotomayor on the
panel, affirming the decision of the District Court. Jd.
156
See Shapiro, supra note 16.
157
Ricci, 530 F.3d at 88-90 (2d Cir. 2008) (Barrington, J., concurring) (referring to
Second Circuit precedent for the proposition that: (I) "a public employer, faced with a prima
facie case of disparate-impact liability under Title VII, does not violate Title VII or the Equal
Protection Clause by taking facially neutral, albeit race-conscious, actions to avoid such
liability"; (2) "[b]ecause there was no racial classification, the plaintiffs bore the burden of
persuasion on the issue of discriminatory purpose"; and (3) it was appropriate for the panel to
have adopted the reasoning set forth in the District Court opinion).
158
See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
154
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C. Collegiality and the Diversity of Opinion

As a final note to this section, it should not be assumed that the
diversity of perspectives of judges with diverse backgrounds, and the
extent to which the soundness of a decision is tested by such diversity by
exposing it to competing points of view, will ultimately lead to chaos and
confrontation on the courts. That the perspectives gained by Judge
Sotomayor's unique experiences with poverty or discrimination would
inevitably lead to a result based, not on the facts of the case, but on such
experiences, cannot be divined from her responses to questioning before
the Senate.
The existence of competing viewpoints need not be manifested
through adversarial relations on the court. Judge Harry T. Edwards, in an
essay focusing on the importance of collegiality to decision-making in the
federal circuit courts, makes the point that collegiality does not mean
"friendship," "homogeneity," or "conformity" amongst the members of a
court, but rather, that ''judges have a common interest, as members of the
judiciary, in getting the law right, and that, as a result, we are willing to
listen, persuade, and be persuaded, all in an atmosphere of civility and
respect." 159 In fact, it is through collegiality that diverse viewpointswhich I posit is one characteristic of a healthy and robust judiciary-may
be voiced and considered. 160 In short, "because of collegiality, judges can
admit and recognize their own and other judges' fallibility and
intellectual vulnerabilities." 161
My own experience as an appellate judge over the past nineteen years
has driven home the importance of a diverse bench, our production and
efficiency enhanced by a spirit of collegiality. The Maryland Court of
Special Appeals, the State's intermediate appellate court, was created in
1966; its jurisdiction, at its inception, limited only to criminal appeals. 162

159

Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA.
L. REv. 1639, 1644-45 (2003) (internal citation omitted).
160
/d. at 1645.
161
/d. at 1650.
162
The Maryland State Archives provides a detailed account of the progression of the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, from its inception to its current composition:
The Court of Special Appeals was created in 1966 by constitutional amendment
(Acts of 1966, ch. 11, 12). Originally, five judges served on the court. Each was
elected from a special appellate circuit. In 1970, special appellate circuits were
abolished and one judge then was elected from each of the first five appellate
judicial circuits, two from the Sixth Appellate Judicial Circuit representing
Baltimore City, and two from the state at large (Acts of 1970, ch. 99).
The number of judges on the Court of Special Appeals has increased several times:
from five to nine in 1970, from nine to ten in 1972 (Acts of 1972, ch. 361 ), from ten
to twelve in 1974 (Acts of 1974, ch. 706), and from twelve to thirteen in 1977 (Acts
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The first female was appointed to the Court of Special Appeals in 1972 163
and the first African-American was appointed to the Court in 1974. 164
Currently, there are three women and two African-American judges on
the thirteen-member Court. 165 The legal backgrounds of the judges are
diverse: six members, including myself, have come to the Court having
served as trial court judges; 166 two members were formerly government
lawyers; 167 and five judges were formerly private practitioners. 168 In
addition, judges retired from the Court, including a nationally renowned
constitutional scholar, currently sit on panels with the thirteen active
members of the Court and are available with their wealth of appellate
experience to provide additional points of view and legal counsel on
complex issues. 169 Collaboration between these judges who have
of 1977, ch. 252). Currently, six of the thirteen judges are elected from the state at
large.
The chief judge of the Court of Special Appeals is chosen by the governor from
among those judges elected to the Court (Acts of 1966, ch. 11, 12).
Md. State Archives, Historical List, Court of Special Appeals (1967-),
http://www.msa.md.gov/msa/speccol/sc2600/sc2685/html/ctspapp.html (last visited Nov. 24,
2009).
163
Rita C. Davidson was the first female judge appointed to the Court.
164
The first African-American appointed to the Court was David T. Mason. Rasmussen,
supra note 98 and accompanying text.
165
The three women currently serving on the Court are the Honorable Ellen Lipton
Hollander, the Honorable Deborah S. Eyler, and the Honorable Kathryn Grill Graeff. The two
African-American judges currently serving are the Honorable Alexander Wright, Jr. and
myself, Arrie Wilson Davis.
166
The former trial judges on the Court are the Honorable Ellen Hollander, the Honorable
James P. Salmon, the Honorable Patrick L. Woodward, the Honorable Alexander Wright, Jr.,
and the Honorable Albert J. Matricciani.
167
Former government lawyers currently on the Court include the Honorable Robert A
Zarnoch and the Honorable Kathryn Grill Graeff.
168
The Honorable James R. Eyler, the Honorable Deborah S. Eyler, the Honorable
Timothy E. Meredith, the Honorable Christopher B. Kehoe, and the Honorable Peter Krauser.
169
The Honorable Charles E. Moylan, Jr., the longest-serving member of the Court from
July 1, 1970 until his retirement on December 14, 2000, has been nationally recognized as the
eminently renown scholar in criminal law and constitutional law dating back to his tenure as
the Baltimore City State's Attorney in the 1960's. Renowned for his expertise in insurance
and property law, the Honorable Lawrence F. Rodowsky, currently shares chambers with
Judge Moylan, after distinguished service on the Court of Appeals from January 25, 1980
until his retirement on November 10, 2000. The Court is indebted to Judges Moylan and
Rodowsky, who combined, as retired judges, author opinions, annually, equal to the number
of opinions authored by a full-time member of the Court. Other retired members of the Court
include the Honorable Paul E. Alpert, the Honorable James A. Kenney, III, the Honorable J.
Frederick Sharer, the Honorable Raymond G. Thieme, Jr., the Honorable James S. Getty and,
until the last moments of his life, our beloved nit picker, whose labor of love in spotting split
infinitives and assorted errors befell Judge Hollander upon his retirement, the Honorable
Theodore G. Bloom. The number of appeals having exploded exponentially during the past
twenty years, these retired judges perform an invaluable service in facilitating the issuance of
thorough and well-reasoned decisions with dispatch.
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backgrounds in different areas of expertise has been beneficial to the
Court. Indeed, oft times, members of the Court decide cases in a manner
that one would not consider compatible with their cultural or
socioeconomic moorings. It is noteworthy that, with the exception of the
Honorable Lynne Battaglia, who was appointed to the Court of Appeals
on December 21, 2000, the remaining six judges currently serving on the
Court of Appeals were formerly members of the Court of Special
Appeals. 170 The result is that, while the High Court has preserved its
most revered traditions and formalities, the alumni of the Intermediate
Appellate Court, many of whom had previously served together, have
merely continued their collegial working relations.
As noted earlier, the benefits to be derived from a diverse court cannot
be realized without collegiality and open lines of communication between
its members, which has been a central focus of Maryland's appellate
courts. From its inception, the policy of the first chief judges of the
Court-Chief Judges Robert Murphy, Charles Orth, Jr., and Richard
Gilbert-was that associate judges, as constitutional officers, were to
remain duty bound and render their best independent judgments as to
issues before them, but that, just as trial judges admonish jurors during
their deliberations to consider opposing views, so too should members of
the Court be open to giving serious consideration to the views of their
colleagues. The late Chief Judge Gilbert, my predecessor, instituted a
tradition that judges have lunch together after hearing oral argument and,
as a reminder, mounted a poster on the wall of the conference room to the
effect that it is difficult to remain disagreeable with those with whom we
break bread. During our monthly conferences, each successive chief
judge, for the most part, has continued the tradition of reigning above the
fray, reserving until our robust discussion and debate in controversial
cases ebb, to inte:rject the imprimatur of his considered judgment; all of
these deliberations are carried out in a spirit of congeniality. And, of
course, once the final vote is cast as to the ultimate decision or on any
issue, the Chief Judge, in the tradition of the Court, graciously accepts the
will of the majority, exacting no manner of vindictiveness against
members holding opposing views. Collegiality is also fostered by
attendance at formal ceremonies and interaction in social settings. In
sum, the mix of judges with the divergent perspectives of former
practitioners, former government attorneys, former trial judges, and
170
The remaining six judges on the Court of Appeals, in order of seniority, are Chief
Judge Robert M. Bell, appointed May 5, 1991, the Honorable Glenn T. Harrell, Jr., appointed
on September 10, 1999, the Honorable Clayton Greene, Jr., appointed on January 7, 2004, the
Honorable Joseph F. Murphy, Jr., appointed on December 4, 2007, the Honorable Sally D.
Adkins, appointed on May 27, 2008, and the Honorable Mary Ellen Barbera, appointed on
August 7, 2008.
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judges who have retired from the Court provides an invaluable resource
of experience in the different areas of expertise.

III. THE RULE OF LAW AND THE CONTINUED APPLICABILITY OF THE
"UMPIRE" ANALOGY

As noted in the previous section, the focus of this article should not be
read as supporting the notion that a judge should render decisions based
solely on his or her own ideological bend. The influence of a judge's
personal experiences on his or her approach to the resolution of legal
issues exists, as it must, within a well-established model and in the
construct of the rule of law and precedent; i.e., reference to the prior
application of common law to similar or identical facts and the
interpretation of statutes and Constitutional provisions in like manner to
previous constructions. A consideration of the role of the judge begins
with the relationship between the judiciary and the other two branches of
government. Unlike a member of the executive and legislative branch
who proposes and implements governmental actions, the role of a judge is
reactive. A statute is enacted or a cause of action accrues and it is the
judiciary which must construe or determine the constitutionality of the
Thus,
statute or adjudicate the merits of the cause of action.
notwithstanding the debate as to whether judges should render decisions
according to the letter of the law, there is no debate that the role of a
judge is restricted, at least in the sense that judges do not initiate legal
proceedings.
Moreover, although the debate as to the proper role of a judge, most
recently typified by Judge Sotomayor's confirmation hearings, has been
often framed, ideologically and politically, in terms of conservative
versus liberal judges, that the "rule of law"-whatever we determine it to
be-is the anchor of a stable society, has not been a subject of that
debate. The bedrock of the rule of law are the principles of stare decisis
and precedent which provide, inter alia, the guideposts as to the outer
limits of conduct that is legally permissible and establishes legal
relationships and the rights and obligations attendant thereto. Without
reference to the body of law established by prior decisions and deference
to the legal reasoning undergirding those decisions, there can be no
continuity in the evolvement of the law, even in instances in which legal
precedent is deemed to be unsustainable in light of changes in social,
political or other circumstances. In other words, abandonment of
precedential authority is justified only where the reasons therefore are
sound and enduring.
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With this in mind, there is continued vitality in what has been termed
the "umpire" analogy. 171 This analogy was espoused by Chief Justice
Roberts during his confirmation hearings:
Judges and justices are servants of the law, not the other way
around. Judges are like umpires. Umpires don't make the rules,
they apply them. The role of the umpire and a judge is critical.
They make sure everyone plays by the rules but it is a limited
role. Nobody ever went to a ball game to see the umpire. 172
The "umpire" analogy has been viewed favorably by some and criticized
by others. 173 No single theory can adequately capture the role of the
judge in democratic government and, in that sense, the analogy between
the roles of judges and umpires is imperfect. 174 The comparison is
flawed, in the first instance, because, contrary to the proposition that the
role of an umpire is purely mechanical, the conception of the role of an
umpire breaks down in light of the broad discretion exercised every time
an umpire renders a decision as to what constitutes the strike zone, a
judgment that varies, often widely, from one umpire to the next and may
even vary from one pitch to the next. 175 Is the outcome of a baseball
game affected by whether the strike zone is expansive or limited in a
contest between a team whose batters constitute the proverbial
Murderer's Row and another team of mediocre hitters? Of course it is.
Nonetheless, for purposes of this article, the analogy offers a compelling
reminder that judges are not the "stars" of the show. They are the arbiters
of the law. Given the universal precepts of equal justice under the law
and of the symbol of blindfolded Lady Justice, analogizing the role of a
judge to an umpire, while imperfect, provides a vibrant way of
conceptualizing an important consideration as to the proper role of
judges, provided that this analogy is tempered by an understanding that
judges often must render discretionary decisions that require a judge to do
much more than merely "call balls and strikes."

171

Michael P. Allen, A Limited Defense of (at Least Some of) the Umpire Analogy, 32
U. L. REv. 525, 525-26 (2009) (quoting Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of
John G. Roberts, Jr. To Be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005)).
SEATTLE

172
173
174
175

!d.
!d. at 530.
!d. at 527.
!d. Chemerinsky goes further than finding the analogy "flawed"; in his view, it is

"disingenuous" and "tremendously arrogant," in light of the discretionary decisions inherent
to the role of a judge. Chemerinsky, supra note 48, at I 069-70, I 077.
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IV. CONCLUSION

Judge Sotomayor, who was ultimately confirmed by a Senate vote of
sixty-eight to thirty-one to join the Supreme Court of the United States as
its first Latina justice 176 and was subsequently sworn in at an August 8,
2009, ceremony in the Supreme Court conference room, may confound
the prognosticators who believe that she will be a mainstay of the liberal
bloc of Justices Stevens, Breyer and Ginsburg. Or, she may rule in a
manner consistent with commentators who have analyzed her opinions
and suggest that she will not join the conservative bloc on decisions
involving cultural or civil rights. The future of her role on the Court
remains to be seen. From her confirmation process, however, and based
on the foregoing, the following is what I distill.
First, contrary to the view of strict formalists and proponents of a
discretion-free role for judges, the ability to empathize is integral to the
deliberative process in fostering a better understanding of the context and
societal impact of the issue under review and facilitates a mindset that
allows for due consideration of points of view of the judge's colleagues,
framed by an environment respecting difference and promoting
collegiality. The basis and the raison d'etre of the controversy before the
court, in the first instance, is informed, not only as to the party who
should prevail, but also as to the course to be pursued in fashioning the
appropriate remedy.
Second, the literal definition of "empathy" denotes no consequential
manifestation of "the capacity to experience feelings of another" 177 on the
judge's ultimate decision. Having empathized with one or more parties
or a particular situation or point of view, the judge must then conclude
that, in the overwhelming majority of cases in which there is no rationale
that would justify disregarding precedent, empathy should play no role.
With respect to the ultimate decision, empathy, in the proper case, plays a
role where an overriding societal interest is at stake. The pillar, however,
always has been and remains the rule of law-the product of precedent
and well-reasoned legal analysis. A judge, accordingly, functions
essentially within the framework of an 'umpire," fastidiously examining
the law and applying the relevant law to the facts before the judge in
order to arrive at just, well-reasoned and well-supported decisions.
Finally, the judicial selection process must begin with the sober reality
that not everyone possesses the personal qualities, particularly the
temperament, to be a judge. Few professions, positions, or callings
demand a higher personal fidelity to serve the best interest of society in a
176

Sotomayor approved by US Senate,
http:/lnews.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8188485 .stm.
177
See supra note 74.

BBC

NEWS,

Aug.

6,
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manner that is unimpeachable and beyond reproach. The most important
quality is the ability to engage in introspection and constant self-analysis,
and a corresponding ability to set aside, not only biases and prejudices,
but deeply entrenched preconceived views that prevent fair and objective
consideration of opposing views, irrespective of whether the judge
actually adopts those views. At the same time, the awesome authority
that a judge-especially a trial judge-wields over the fate of his or her
fellow citizens demands no less than that he or she be ever mindful of the
maxim: "There but for the grace of God go I." And, as difficult as it may
be to empathize with one who has visited great harm on his or her fellow
citizens, empathy, in the sense that a judge should vicariously inculcate
the intimidating experience of standing before the Bar of Justice, 178
whether the outcome is likely to be life altering or less serious, is critical
in order to accord the parties-and more importantly the Court-the
proper solemnity, even in cases which call for the ultimate penalty as the
appropriate judgment.

178

The Supreme Court of Florida expressed this point of view best in In re Eastmoore:
Socrates is reported to have expressed the same proposition (edicts of the Florida
Code of Judicial Conduct) in his day as follows: Four things belong to a judge: to
hear courteously; to answer wisely; to consider soberly; and to decide impartially.
As this Court said in State ex rei. Davis v. Parks, 141 Fla. 516, 520, 194 So. 613,
615 (1939):
lt is not enough for a judge to assert that he is free from prejudice. His
mien and the reflex from his court room speak louder than he can declaim
on this point. If he fails through these avenues to reflect justice and square
dealing, his usefulness is destroyed. The attitude of the judge and the
atmosphere of the court room should indeed be such that no matter what
charge is lodged against a litigant or what cause he is called on to litigate,
he can approach the bar with every assurance that he is in a forum where
the judicial ermine is everything that it typifies, purity and justice. The
guaranty of a fair and impartial trial can mean nothing less than this.

The public can have little confidence in the impartiality of a decision when the
litigant is cut short in the presentation of her case and the decision maker's demeanor
bears all the indicia of prejudice and a closed mind.
We take this opportunity to remind ourselves as judges that tyranny is nothing more
than ill-used power. We recognize that it is easy, especially under the stress of
handling many marital matters, to lose one's judicial temper, but judges must
recognize the gross unfairness of becoming a combatant with a party. A litigant,
already nervous, emotionally charged, and perhaps fearful, not only risks losing the
case but also contempt and a jail sentence by responding to a judge's rudeness in
kind. The disparity in power between a judge and a litigant requires that a judge
treat a litigant with courtesy, patience, and understanding. Conduct reminiscent of
the playground bully of our childhood is improper and unnecessary.
504 So. 2d 756, 757-58 (Fla. 1987) (emphasis added).

38

University of Baltimore Law Forum

[Vol. 40.1

It is this quality that separates the manner in which judges perform

their roles from every other profession or calling, i.e., the ability to render
an appropriate, even the most severe judgment, while treating the object
of that judgment in the manner that the judge would wish to be treated
were the positions reversed. While such a view may seem lofty,
altruistic, and naive, particularly when dealing with those whose acts may
be deemed depraved or despicable, it is precisely what is demanded of us.

